Projection and assumed similarity
People tend to assume others share their choices and views, and their own interest can colour how they read someone else's.
Evidence: Supported with caveatsSupported with caveats: Several studies agree, with stated limits such as student samples or lab settings. This is the weakest level among the claims below.
What the research shows
Research consistently finds the false consensus effect: people who make a choice estimate that more others would make it too, and a large preregistered multi-site study replicated two of the original scenarios with effects at least as large as before. Several studies find that people who are more interested themselves tend to rate others as more interested; in a speed-dating study of 1,226 people, the average sex difference in over- and under-perceiving interest became negligible once projection of one's own interest and attitudes to casual sex were taken into account. What you can take from it: your own interest is evidence about you; learn about theirs by watching and asking.1234
What dating marketing says it shows
A typical sales line, written for this page
Dating marketing rarely names projection. A typical sales line promises: "If you feel the chemistry, so does she, so trust your gut and act." Lines like this treat your own feeling as a reading of hers.
What doesn't follow
Projection describes a bias in estimating others; it does not say who is right in a particular encounter, and your own strong interest is not evidence of the other person's.
Limits
False-consensus studies used hypothetical scenarios, mostly with online and student samples. Projection of interest comes from scenario ratings and one speed-dating study; these are associations, not proof of a mechanism. Not tested in ongoing real encounters.
Sources
Each numbered mark above opens the evidence behind that statement: the label, what it does not show and where it comes from.
Evidence: Well supportedPeople who choose one option tend to think more others would choose it too, a pattern called the false consensus effect.
Why this label
A meta-analysis or several independent studies agree, with no serious failure to replicate. Demonstrates: in Ross and colleagues' 1977 scenarios, people who chose an option estimated that more peers would choose it than people who chose the other option did; a 1985 meta-analysis of 115 tests is reported by Many Labs 2 as finding a robust, moderate effect (r = .31); the large replication below found it again. It shows a bias in estimating how common a view or choice is, not a way to read a particular person. Marketing framing: none common.
What it does not show
- Mostly hypothetical scenarios and self-reported estimates of peers, not real partners
- Original studies used undergraduates; replication used many samples but mainly online participants
- The 1985 abstract was not seen: its figures come from the Many Labs 2 summary
- Replication status: replicated in Many Labs 2 (see projection-assumed-similarity-c2)
Who it applies to
A pattern across groups of people, not a statement about any one person.
Sources
- Ross, L., Greene, D., House, P. (1977). The "false consensus effect": An egocentric bias in social perception and attribution processes, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology.
- Mullen, B., Atkins, J. L., Champion, D. S., Edwards, C. (1985). The false consensus effect: A meta-analysis of 115 hypothesis tests, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology.
- Klein, R. A., Vianello, M., Hasselman, F., et al. (2018). Many Labs 2: Investigating Variation in Replicability Across Samples and Settings, Advances in Methods and Practices in Psychological Science.
Evidence: Well supportedIn a large preregistered multi-site replication (Many Labs 2), two of the original false-consensus scenarios replicated with effects at least as large as the originals.
Why this label
A meta-analysis or several independent studies agree, with no serious failure to replicate. Demonstrates: in the accepted-manuscript results, the supermarket scenario gave d = 1.18 in an aggregate sample of 7,205 (original d = 0.99) and the traffic-ticket scenario gave d = 0.95 in 7,827 (original d = 0.80). Overall, 15 of 28 Many Labs 2 findings replicated, so this one is among the ones that held. Marketing framing: none common.
What it does not show
- Only two scenarios from one 1977 paper were tested; other false-consensus designs were not
- Many Labs 2 samples were mostly online and not representative of all populations; the paper reported little WEIRD versus less-WEIRD heterogeneity overall
- Self-reported estimates; says nothing about accuracy in reading a real person's interest
- Many Labs 1 was not checked for this effect
- Replication status: this claim reports a preregistered multi-site replication itself.
Who it applies to
A pattern across groups of people, not a statement about any one person.
Source
- Klein, R. A., Vianello, M., Hasselman, F., et al. (2018). Many Labs 2: Investigating Variation in Replicability Across Samples and Settings, Advances in Methods and Practices in Psychological Science.
Evidence: Supported with caveatsPeople who are more interested themselves tend to rate others as more interested, which can colour how friendly behaviour is read; see romantic-vs-platonic-signals-c6.
Why this label
Several studies agree, with stated limits such as student samples or lab settings. Demonstrates: Lenton and colleagues found people with greater desire for casual sex perceived more sexual intent in others, stronger when the target's motive was ambiguous; Lee and colleagues (speed dating, 1,226 people) found the sex gap in over- and under-perception became negligible once sociosexual orientation and projection of one's own interest were modelled. Marketing framing: none common.
What it does not show
- Scenario ratings and speed-dating ratings; self-report
- Statistical-model result and associations, not proof of a causal mechanism
- Does not say who is right in any particular encounter; checking kindly and directly is what resolves it
- No large registered replication found; same two sources as romantic-vs-platonic-signals-c6
Who it applies to
A pattern across groups of people, not a statement about any one person.
Sources
- Lenton, A. P., Bryan, A., Hastie, R., Fischer, O. (2007). We Want the Same Thing: Projection in Judgments of Sexual Intent, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin.
- Lee, A. J., Sidari, M. J., Murphy, S. C., Sherlock, J. M., Zietsch, B. P. (2020). Sex Differences in Misperceptions of Sexual Interest Can Be Explained by Sociosexual Orientation and Men Projecting Their Own Interest Onto Women, Psychological Science.
Evidence: Supported with caveatsPeople who want more sexual involvement themselves tend to see more sexual interest in others, so one's own wishes can colour how friendliness is read.
Why this label
Several studies agree, with stated limits such as student samples or lab settings. Lenton and colleagues found projection of one's own casual-sex desire onto others, stronger when the target's motive was ambiguous. Lee and colleagues found that sex differences in misperception shrank once such projection and sociosexual orientation were accounted for.
What it does not show
- Two papers using study-setting ratings (scenario or speed dating)
- Self-report measures
- Associations, not proof of a causal mechanism
- Does not say who is right in a particular encounter; checking directly and kindly is what resolves it
Who it applies to
A pattern across groups of people, not a statement about any one person.
Sources
- Lenton, A. P., Bryan, A., Hastie, R., Fischer, O. (2007). We Want the Same Thing: Projection in Judgments of Sexual Intent, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin.
- Lee, A. J., Sidari, M. J., Murphy, S. C., Sherlock, J. M., Zietsch, B. P. (2020). Sex Differences in Misperceptions of Sexual Interest Can Be Explained by Sociosexual Orientation and Men Projecting Their Own Interest Onto Women, Psychological Science.